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ABSTRACT
This Essay considers the desirability and possibility of the US. federal
and state courts increasing their level of engagement with foreign and
international aw when deciding domestic law questions. In considering
this important issue, I give sustained and careful consideration to
Professor Vicki C. Jackson's masterful work, Constitutional Engagement in
a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press 2010), which anyone
undertaking serious scholarly work on the question of transnational
judicial dialogue will find an essential resource. Professor Jackson
proposes a troika of models that national court systems can adopt with
respect o incorporating comparative and international aw materials into
their domestic jurisprudence: resistance, convergence, and engagement.
Jackson buttresses her theoretical typology with significant empirical
support. Systemic considerations associated with both the legal culture and
broader general culture will, however, strongly impact a particular
nation's approach to reconciling foreign and international law with
domestic law. For example, the United States seems to poorly equip its
judges and lawyers for engagement, given the minimalistic efforts to
incorporate comparative law perspectives into the standard J.D.
curriculum (to say nothing of the broader problem of a general lack of
interest in acquiring foreign language skills). Engagement has much to
recommend it, in terms of policy and theory, but to successfully embrace
this model, judges, lawyers, and the legal academy must be prepared to
devote greater resources to inculcating the skills necessary for this kind of
legal research, writing, and advocacy.
INTRODUCTION: THE OBSERVER EFFECT AND TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ENGAGEMENT
In our increasingly globalized world, every national judicial system
must have a standard for assessing the relevance-or irrelevance-of
foreign and international law. There are three basic approaches to
incorporating-or ignoring-international and comparative law when
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interpreting and applying domestic legal sources (including, but not limited
to, a constitution): resistance, convergence, or engagement.' Moreover, as
Professor Vicki C. Jackson has observed, "[i]t is much harder today than in
the past for constitutional courts to avoid taking positions on the role of
international or foreign law." 2
Domestic courts will find it increasingly difficult to simply ignore that
which they already know-simply put, legal knowledge does not respect
national boundaries; access to comparative law materials is, quite literally,
a Google search away. As Professor Jackson argues, "[t]he Internet and its
search engines have created enormous accessibility of resources."3 Foreign
constitutional courts have worked to make their decisions available to a
larger global community of judges, lawyers, scholars, and law students. In
addition, "[n]ot only is foreign and international law more accessible, but
there is simply more of it in the world today-more constitutional law, and
more international law, touching on topics historically viewed as belonging
to the realm of constitutional law."5
In a modern, globalized society, knowledge is viral, and once caught,
cannot be easily shed.6 One cannot undo awareness of same-sex marriage
in Canada,7  state-sanctioned euthanasia in the Netherlands,8  or the
1. VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 8-9 (2010).
2. Id. at 5; see also David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue,
86 WASH. L. REv. 523, 525 (2011) ("No aspect of the globalization of constitutional law has thus far
attracted more attention or controversy than the use of foreign and international legal materials by
constitutional courts.").
3. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 5-6.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497 (2008) ("For further contrast with
American practice, Canada nd Australia allow exemplary damages for outrageous conduct, but awards
are considered extraordinary and rarely issue ..... Noncompensatory damages are not part of the civil-
code tradition and thus unavailable in such countries as France, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland....
And some legal systems not only decline to recognize punitive damages themselves but refuse to
enforce foreign punitive judgments as contrary to public policy."). The Baker majority's invocation of
foreign law to determine whether punitive damages should be available in admiralty cases did not
provoke a single word of dissent from any member of the Supreme Court; presumably this was so
because admiralty law should incorporate and reflect the common practices and usages among nations
more than, say, the question of punitive damage awards under the domestic tort law of the states.
7. See Halpern v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2003] 225 D.L.R. 4th 529, paras. 125, 142 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); see also EGALE Can. Inc. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2001] 95 B.C.L.R. 3d 122, paras. 158-59
(Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). For a discussion of these decisions and of the rights of sexual minorities under the
Charter more generally, see Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and the Charter: The Achievement
ofFormal Equality (1985-2005) and Its Limits, 49 McGILL L.J. 1143, 1158-72 (2004).
8. See DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE 143-48 (1st ed. 1998) (discussing
the decriminalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands); Mason L. Allen, Note, Crossing the Rubicon:
The Netherlands' Steady March Towards Involuntary Euthanasia, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 535, 539,
546-47 (2006) (discussing adoption of legislation normalizing access to physician-assisted suicide and
permitting the use of euthanasia in the Netherlands).
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decriminalization of many recreational drugs in Mexico.9 Mere knowledge
of legal rules at variance with current U.S. baselines must, in some way,
affect the way a judge thinks about, and frames, these legal issues.'0 One
cannot successfully pretend not to know what, in point of fact, one does
know about the way another legal system has attempted to resolve a
common legal or policy problem, nor can the effect of this knowledge be
compartmentalized and ignored when considering a domestic legal rule.
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle applies in this context no less than
with respect to subatomic particles; observation changes both the observer
and the observed. As Professor Jackson argues, "[k]nowledge once thus
acquired does not simply disappear."" She is also quite correct in
suggesting that "[m]ore generally, ideas have never respected national
boundaries, and modern communications technology facilitates the rapid
spread of ideas and processes of permeation that can make origins difficult
to track."l2 Thus, "[t]he mere existence in the world of alternative and
overlapping systems for declaring and protecting individual rights changes
constitutional adjudication."1 3
Perhaps to state the obvious, however, certain domestic concerns are
likely to supersede even the strongest and most pressing national
commitment to integrating foreign and international law into a domestic
legal system. No nation-state is capable of a universal and unflinching
commitment to global legal integration, regardless of the domestic social,
9. See Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley
General de Salud, del C6digo Penal Federal y del C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Penales [Decree
Amending, Supplementing or Repealing Certain Provisions of the General Health Law, the Federal
Criminal Code and Federal Code of Criminal Procedure], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 20 de
Agosto de 2009 (Mex.); Associated Press, Mexico Legalizes Drug Possession, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2009, at A12; see also Matthew S. Jenner, International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a
Domestic Solution, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 901, 916-18 (2011) (discussing the liberalization
of Mexico's drug laws).
10. This simply reflects the "observer effect" noted in the sciences, such as physics: in some
cases, the act of observing a phenomenon can affect or change it; so too, simply knowing that another
polity has reached a different answer to a common question can and will affect how one thinks about
the question. See generally Susan Hyde, The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment, 60 WORLD POL. 37 (2007); D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion,
90 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 13-15, 19, 33-35 (2002). In physics, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle relates
to the problem of observer effects-the act of attempting to observe a subatomic particle changes or
alters it. See WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND BEYOND: ENCOUNTERS AND CONVERSATIONS 76-81
(Ruth N. Anshen ed., Arnold J. Pomerans trans., Allen and Unwin, 1971). This same problem exists
with respect to efforts to isolate a particular legal system from the influence of other domestic legal
systems, and also from international law.
11. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 126.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 127.
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political, or economic consequences.14 Jackson suggests that "the
Constitution and constitutional law express or help constitute a national
identity, which is understood, in part, in comparison with that of other
nations."1 Thus, a nation might have a relatively robust commitment to
global legal norms (e.g., South Africa, Canada, or France), but this
commitment should not, and will not, always carry the day.
The choice among resistance, convergence, or engagement1 6 will also
impact the visibility and importance of that system within the ongoing
transnational judicial dialogue that currently takes place between and
among judges within both domestic and international juridical bodies. A
position of resistance, for example, might well reduce the influence of a
jurisdiction within the larger ongoing conversation.1 7 Thus, to the extent
that U.S. courts fail to engage foreign and international law, the influence
of our domestic courts could well be reduced.
Professor Sarah K. Harding has noted that unlike the Supreme Court of
Canada, "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court ... has focused on the formation of a
highly autonomous national legal system."'8 She posits that "the rejection
of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court is justified, at least partially, by
reasons that also help explain its concerns about authority within the
14. For example, despite Germany's leadership in and support of the European Union, the
German Federal Constitutional Court has made clear that, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict
between a provision of the Basic Law and an EU Directive, the imperatives of the Basic Law must take
precedence. See Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German
Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 229 (1997). Grimm, a
former member of the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany's highest constitutional tribunal, has
explained that:
The German Constitutional Court has ruled that the effective protection of fundamental
rights is an essential and inalienable feature of the Basic Law. This entails, according to the
Court, not only the necessity of Community law being compatible with national (German)
fundamental rights provisions; it also led the Court to assert in Solange I its own power to
check Community rules against he standards of fundamental rights protection contained in
the Basic Law.
Id. at 233. Nor has "the German Constitutional Court ... relinquished its competence to scrutinize
Community legislation. The Court is merely refraining from exercising its - still existing -
jurisdiction." Id. at 234.
15. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 128.
16. See id. at 17-38 (discussing "resistance" to comparative and international law), 39-69
(discussing "convergence" with comparative and international law), 71-102 (discussing "engagement"
with comparative and international law).
17. Empirical studies have established that the Supreme Court of the United States is increasingly
less influential than other constitutional courts. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining
Influence of the U.S. Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 762 (2012); see also Adam Liptak, 'We the
People'Loses Appeal with People Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at Al.
18. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 409, 412
(2003); see also Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005).
2014] 109
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American legal system" and that this approach "can be seen as a response
to both local and global influences."l9
And, yet, it would be mistaken to assume that the United States
maintains a successful posture of resistance to all foreign and international
law influences. In fact, most domestic legal systems take some account of
international law (if not comparative law). The U.S. Constitution expressly
provides that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.2 0
Article III also expressly endorses the relevance of treaties to domestic
U.S. law by extending the judicial power of the United States to include
claims arising under treaties.21 Accordingly, to the extent that international
law rests on treaties that have been signed by the President and ratified by
the Senate, international law comprises an important part of the domestic
law of the United States.22 Treaties, however, are part of international law
rather than the domestic law of another polity (i.e., comparative law).
The general policy question of whether the domestic federal courts, and
the Supreme Court in particular, should consider foreign law has provoked
a widespread and fiercely contested debate in the United States.23 Recent
nominees to the Supreme Court of the United States have been asked to
explain the relevance, if any, of foreign law to the interpretation and
application of our Constitution.2 4 Indeed, the four most recent nominees to
19. Harding, supra note 18, at 412.
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority." (emphasis added)).
22. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (upholding the extension of
congressional regulatory power via ratification of a treaty but cautioning that "[w]e do not mean to
imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a
different way" than simply asking whether the treaty power expands the scope of Congress's powers
under Article 1, Section 8).
23. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice, United States Supreme Court, "A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,
Address to the International Academy of Comparative Law (July 30, 2010), in I FIU L. REv. 27 (2010);
Full Written Transcript ofScalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, FREE REPUBLIC (Feb. 27, 2005, 8:44
PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts; see also Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares
Views on Influence ofForeign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A 14.
24. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200-01 (2005) (statement of
110 [Vol. 66:1:105
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the Supreme Court,25 to a one, have disclaimed any interest in placing
significant precedential reliance on foreign law-whether in the form of
statutes, constitutions, or judicial decisions.26 Despite this promise to
forebear consideration of such materials, other members of the Supreme
Court have taken a different approach, citing as persuasive authority the
legal rules and decisions of other national courts and international bodies.27
The question continues to have salience, and the decision to consider
foreign law cannot really be answered with a simple "yes" or "no." What's
more, the Justices ostensibly most hostile to considering foreign law-even
as merely persuasive authority-such as Associate Justice Antonin Scalia
and former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, have themselves cited
contemporary foreign law (albeit negatively). Chief Justice Rehnquist did
so in his majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,2 8 and Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr., Supreme Court nominee) (rejecting use of foreign legal materials in U.S.
constitutional interpretation); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Supreme Court nominee) (same);
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 464-
65 (2009) (statement of Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court nominee) (agreeing that foreign law lacks
precendential value but observing that foreign and international law could help get the "creative juices
flowing" and also positing that such authorities could be useful when considering novel legal
questions). Justice Elena Kagan also rejected affording formal precedential value to foreign legal
decisions, but observed that she was "in favor of good ideas coming from wherever you can get them"
and that "there are a number of circumstances" in which considering foreign law as persuasive authority
might be appropriate. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith
Cong. 127 (2010).
25. This group of most-recently appointed Justices includes Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
(2005) and Associate Justices Samuel A. Alito (2005), Sonia Sotomayor (2009), and Elena Kagan
(2010).
26. See supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576-78 (2005) (citing the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, unratified in the United States, and the domestic law of the United Kingdom, Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003) (citing authority from Ireland, the United Kingdom, and
the European Court of Human Rights); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing the
amicus brief of the European Union and noting that "within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved").
For a general survey of the Supreme Court's citation of foreign legal authority in its published
decisions, see Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). For a more general analysis and discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, The
Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 1335 (2006) and Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections
on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69 (2004).
28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 ("This concern is further supported by
evidence about the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Dutch government's own study
revealed that in 1990, there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as 'the deliberate
termination of another's life at his request'), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of
euthanasia without an explicit request.").
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Scalia did so, in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.2 9 If foreign
legal materials are simply irrelevant to the interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution, then even negative references to foreign law ought to be
avoided in the pages of U.S. Reports.
This Essay proceeds in three main parts. Part I surveys and analyzes
Professor Jackson's arguments for, and also against, transnational judicial
engagement and its potential cost and benefits; in the end, Jackson is a
cautious advocate of transnational engagement as a means of improving the
quality of constitutional adjudication in both the United States and
elsewhere. Part II considers some of the most important factors that could
lead a national court system to adopt-or reject-a posture of engagement;
this Part argues that many of these factors will cut against the United States
adopting a posture of more active engagement. Part III posits that, absent a
stronger commitment to incorporating comparative and international law
into the standard J.D. curriculum, the prospects for U.S. courts embracing
significantly enhanced levels of judicial engagement will be limited. This
Part also argues that effective engagement probably requires a community
of judges and lawyers who are trained in the use of comparative and
international law materials as law students and who are comfortable relying
on such materials in their day-to-day work.
I conclude my argument by positing that, in the absence of meaningful
institutional change within courts and law schools, significantly enhanced
levels of transnational judicial engagement within the United States will
not happen. Even so, Professor Jackson's thoughtful defense of
engagement as the best potential approach for advancing U.S.
constitutional values, both at home and abroad, possesses ignificant merit
and persuasive force. The difficulty lies in translating her theoretical
arguments in favor of engagement into a practical agenda for securing
change. Unless and until U.S. judges demonstrate significantly greater
interest in hearing arguments premised on comparative and international
law, U.S. courts will continue to play only a limited role in the ongoing
process of transnational judicial dialogue.
29. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court today pretends that it possesses
a similar freedom of action, so that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has
recently occurred in Canada (in a decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not o appeal). See
Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ontario Ct. App.); Cohen, Dozens in Canada Follow Gay
Couple's Lead, Washington Post, June 12, 2003, p. A25.").
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I. PROFESSOR JACKSON'S THEORY OF JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ERA
Professor Vicki C. Jackson, the Thurgood Marshall Professor of
Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School, has carefully considered the
potential relevance of foreign and international law materials to domestic
constitutional jurisprudence. In her provocative book, Constitutional
Engagement in a Transnational Era,30 she argues that the judges in the
United States should not underestimate the potential benefits of higher
levels of transnational judicial dialogue or, to use Jackson's preferred
nomenclature, a project of "transnational judicial engagement."3 1 Jackson is
one of the foremost scholars in the field of comparative constitutional
law.32
Unlike many legal scholars working in the field of comparative
constitutional law, Professor Jackson is not a categorical advocate, or
opponent, of transnational judicial dialogue. Instead, she is a careful
30. See generally JACKSON, supra note 1.
31. See id. at 9-10, 11-12. Professor Jackson readily acknowledges that "[s]ome scholars refer to
these postures of engagement as 'dialogical,' which implies a conversation, a form of reciprocal
intellectual give and take." Id. at 71. She explains her conscious choice of "engagement," rather than
"dialogue," as reflecting her view that "the posture of engagement may or may not imply felt
obligations of reciprocity," noting that "[a] court may engage the work of other courts, or the
experiences of other polities, or international human rights instruments, without any necessary
expectation of response." Id. Thus, "[flor this reason I speak of 'engagement' rather than 'dialogue."'
Id. For a discussion of the concept of transnational judicial dialogue and a survey of the arguments
advanced by some of its principal proponents, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach the
World to Sing (in Perfect Harmony) ": International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses - Reflections on
the Perils and Promise of International Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1321, 1322-23, 1327-36
(2006).
32. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005). Moreover, Jackson is also, with her colleague Mark
Tushnet, the co-author of the leading casebook in the field. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2003).
33. Compare David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV.
539, 566 (2001) (arguing that state and federal courts should actively engage the decisions and
precedents of foreign courts when interpreting domestic constitutional texts), Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) (arguing that domestic legal systems
should seek to harmonize and incorporate transnational and international human rights norms), Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191-92 (2003) (advocating
enhanced cooperation and coordination among national judicial systems and positing that such
interactions already take place on a growing basis), and Mark V. Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1307 (1999) (noting the theoretical difficulties,
but also the potential benefits, of national courts attempting to engage each other in formal judicial
decisions), with Roger P. Alford, Free Speech and the Case for Constitutional Exceptionalism, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1071, 1084 (2008) (arguing that consideration of the significant structural and
substantive differences in constitutional texts makes cross-national "borrowing" illegitimate), Roger P.
Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 703 (2005)
[hereinafter Alford, Constitutional Comparativism] (questioning whether any plausible theory of
constitutional interpretation provides a sufficient justification for the incorporation of foreign legal
precedents into domestic constitutional law), Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119
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analyst of the potential costs and benefits of judges engaging both foreign
law and international law within domestic legal systems. As she puts it, she
seeks to investigate "convergence,". "resistance," and "engagement."3 4
Moreover, Professor Jackson rejects the traditional dichotomies commonly
used to establish typologies in this field, such as "monism" and
"dualism."35 In fact, "articulating a single overarching model of the
relationship between transnational law and domestic constitutional
interpretation is probably not reasonable, since states are situated in quite
different relationships to international law and transnational norms."36
Jackson's approach to transnational judicial engagement reflects a
highly thoughtful approach and ultimately comes to rest at a posture of
cautious advocacy of constitutional engagement. Her goal is better judicial
decision making. She explains, in the context of equal protection doctrine,
that "[1]ooking to well-reasoned judgments of other comparable
jurisdictions, as well as to the uses made of these exclusionary categories
by other regimes, can provide forms of checking on our own moral and
constitutional blindness."37 For her, "the central idea is to engage, to
consider, and not, necessarily, to follow or harmonize with" foreign or
international law.
Jackson's book constitutes a comprehensive empirical and theoretical
study of the practice of integrating foreign and international law materials
into a domestic legal system. Importantly, she makes a claim that is, to my
knowledge, quite original to Professor Jackson: it is simply not possible for
a domestic judicial system completely to disengage from the world (as
Justices Scalia and Thomas advocate), but it is equally implausible to
attempt total integration of these disparate legal systems (as legal scholars
such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and Harold Koh have advocated). The book
systematically develops and explains this thesis.39
In light of this reality, Jackson argues that we should look carefully at
the costs and benefits of borrowing in specific contexts; she assiduously
avoids making any universal claims for or against constitutional
HARV. L. REv. 31, 85-86 (2005) (questioning the legitimacy of transnational judicial dialogue), and
Mark V. Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, with Reference to
Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REv. 649, 662 (2004) [hereinafter Tushnet, Some Cautionary Notes]
(questioning the theoretical basis for transnational judicial borrowing and suggesting that too much
comparative constitutional law scholarship focuses on issues of substantive rights, rather than
institutional structure).
34. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 8-9.
35. Id. at 277-78.
36. Id. at 282.
37. Id. at 226.
38. Id. at 284.
39. See id. at 17-102, 273-85.
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engagement between and among legal systems.4 0 Her arguments are
informed by a remarkably broad set of empirical observations and rest on
the actual practices of judges within particular nation-states. To be sure, she
also offers both normative and theoretical arguments for and against
postures of resistance, convergence, and engagement. Her argument tends
to focus carefully on what courts are actually doing, rather than what they
should be doing from a particular theoretical perspective.4 1 Or, to state the
matter more precisely: her theoretical and normative arguments are
grounded in the underlying reality of what actual judges are doing on the
ground.
The first three chapters of Constitutional Engagement in a
Transnational Era consider the problem from the perspective of nations
that resist engagement (Chapter 1), that promote convergence (Chapter 2),
and that abjure both resistance and convergence, instead embracing a
model of "engagement" (Chapter 3). Engagement represents the
Aristotelian "virtuous mean" between the unvirtuous extremes. For
Aristotle, as for Professor Jackson, virtue inheres in avoiding extreme
positions that are not conducive to human flourishing.42
For Jackson, efforts to integrate completely a national constitution with
those of other nations and international law are no less implausible than
attempting to ignore how other democratic polities and international
tribunals have framed and resolved common legal questions.43 On the
difficulties of integration, she explains that "[t]he idea of a constitution is
itself one that may seem to invite resistance or indifference to foreign or
international law"" and adds that "[a]lthough arguments from positivist
understandings of constitutional texts turn out to be surprisingly hard to
make in justifying a general posture of resistance, the arguments from
democracy support resistance to the treatment of transnational norms as
binding on constitutional interpretation."45
40. Cf Koh, supra note 33, at 2397 (endorsing "dialogue between domestic and international
law-declaring institutions" because such dialogue "moves us closer to a unitary, 'monist' legal system,
in which domestic and international law are integrated").
41. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 106-07.
42. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 42-43 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). Aristotle
explains that
moral virtue is a mean and in what sense it is a mean; . . . that it is a mean between two
vices, one of which is marked by excess and the other by deficiency; and. . . that it is a mean
in the sense that it aims at the median in the emotions and in actions.
Id. at 49-50. For example, both cowardice and foolhardiness are extremes that tend to lead to bad
outcomes; the virtuous mean is courage-i.e., having an appropriate level of bravery, rather than a
surfeit or paucity of this quality.
43. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 18-20, 114-18, 129-30.
44. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 38.
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On the other side of the ledger, however, "engaging with transnational
sources of constitution-like law may strengthen both the quality of
decisions and the power of reason-giving as a mechanism of accountability
for politically independent judges."46 In her view, "[c]omparison today is
inevitable."47 In sum, Jackson comprehensively reviews normative and
empirical arguments in favor of transnational engagement (Chapter 4), but
also gives equally careful consideration to arguments against efforts to
integrate domestic law with foreign and international law.48
The book also uses careful consideration of both substantive and
structural issues to demonstrate when and how engagement occurs.49 In
other words, how do judges and courts work through problems that
implicate foreign law, international law, or both? What circumstances make
transnational legal engagement more or less likely? How does it happen? In
this part of her argument, Jackson's emphasis relates not to the theoretical
arguments for or against engagement; instead, she is deeply interested in
considering how real-world courts and judges actually are going about their
work on a day-to-day basis.50 The reality is that judicial decision making
today requires judges in all legal systems both to take cognizance of and
interact with international and foreign legal systems.
Jackson sets forth considerations that should generally govern recourse
to international and comparative law materials when deciding questions of
domestic law. These considerations include the degree of similarity
between legal and economic systems, such as whether a particular polity is
a "rule of law democracy;"51 the presence or absence of a constitution that
creates entrenched rights that are judicially enforceable;52 and more general
similarities in overall government structure, such as the use of federalism.
Jackson argues that,
[o]n a range of issues involving individual rights as well as
structure, countries that are large, federal, and heterogeneous may
offer more persuasive analogies than countries that are small and
46. Id. at 114.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 133-59.
49. Id. at 161-254.
50. It bears noting that both Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter claim to do the same thing-
describe judges in action in an entirely empirical manner. However, their accounts seem driven, at least
in part, by larger normative goals and, more specifically, creating an integrated global legal order that
blurs, if not entirely displaces, the lines currently separating domestic judicial systems and judges.
Jackson's work, by way of contrast, does not collapse an empirical account of transnational judicial
dialogue as it presently exists with larger normative claims about how it ought to exist in an ideal world.
51. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 177-78.
52. Id. at 181.
53. Id. at 181-82.
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homogeneous, and that do not confront to the same extent the
diversity of views and backgrounds that the United States
embraces.54
Jackson's goal is not to present a comprehensive checklist of the relevant
factors and considerations, but rather "a start at identifying how courts
should decide to consider transnational sources in constitutional
adjudication."s
In Chapters 7 and 8, Jackson applies her unfailingly objective critique
of transnational engagement to a substantive area of law (equality
doctrines) and also to a structural question (federalism). Jackson's interest
in thinking about comparative constitutional law in structural terms is
highly important; much of the scholarly work in this area of comparative
public law relates to particular substantive rights and suffers from a results-
oriented cast.56
Take, for example, the issue of government restrictions on abortion.
Jackson posits that a comparative law perspective might help a
constitutional court understand the range of regulations deemed consistent
with a due respect for the autonomy of women. Thus, "[r]eflective
comparisons with the constitutional approaches of other jurisdictions-
including those liberal democracies that recognize, as the United States
does not, a fetal right to life or a state duty to protect fetal life-may yield
useful insights on the difficult questions that arise around abortion
regulation."
On the other hand, transnational borrowing in the context of equal
protection claims might be less plausible because "[t]oo much time and too
many precedents may by now establish the generality of application of the
U.S. approach to the equal protection clause for this to be, on the whole, an
acceptable interpretive move."5 Even in the more domestically-situated
context of equal protection, however, "seeing the question through the eyes
of another country's constitutional system may provide a new lens on
evaluating those optional but compelling interests that may be asserted
within U.S. equal protection law."59
54. Id. at 181.
55. Id. at 183.
56. See Posner, supra note 33, at 85-86; Tushnet, Some Cautionary Notes, supra note 33, at 651-
59; see also G. Brinton Lucas, Note, Structural Exceptionalism and Comparative Constitutional Law,
96 VA. L. REv. 1965, 1965-67 (2010) (arguing that structural separation of powers considerations, in
addition to theoretical and practical considerations, augur against efforts to incorporate foreign and
international law into domestic constitutional jurisprudence).
57. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 217.




Similarly, Jackson expresses skepticism about the potential relevance
of comparative and international law to questions of federalism: "Because
of these variations [in the particular form of federal states], the benefits to
courts of looking to comparative constitutional law on specific issues of
federalism are likely to be more limited than in some other areas of
comparative constitutional law." 60
Jackson is careful not to cherry-pick recourse to comparative and
international law solely when doing so would support her own substantive
policy preferences. Of course, a recurring problem with the use of
comparative and international law materials has been, for lack of a better
turn of phrase, "strategic use" of such arguments in a highly selective
fashion.
For example, advocates of transnational engagement might strongly
dislike a domestic legal rule (e.g., use of the death penalty) and look to
foreign or international law as a basis for arguing that the domestic legal
rule should be rejected in favor of either the foreign norm or the
international law standard. Professor Harold Koh's work on the death
penalty is illustrative of this approach. Koh argues forcefully that the
United States should bring federal and state law on the death penalty into
conformance with international legal norms that oppose the practice
categorically;61 on the other hand, whether he would advocate a global rule
on hate speech, or abortion regulation, remain open-and unanswered-
questions.
Moreover, relatively little existing comparative public law scholarship
engages questions of comparative legal structure and the lessons that might
be gleaned from considering how other nations design government
60. Id. at 227. But cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(using comparative constitutional analysis to argue in favor of the power of the federal government to
require state executive officers to implement federal regulations). Justice Breyer noted that:
At least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local control is
better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the
principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of
Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent
states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules,
regulations, or decrees enacted by the central "federal" body.
Id.
61. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004);
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect o International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 45, 53 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1085, 1085-89, 1092-94, 1129 (2002) [hereinafter World Opinion];
see also William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 797, 799 (1998) ("While it is still premature to declare the death penalty prohibited by
customary international law, it is clear that we are somewhere in the midst of such a process, indeed
considerably close to the goal."). More specifically, Professor Koh posits that "the United States'
administration of the death penalty and international human rights law are on a collision course." World
Opinion, supra, at 1086.
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institutions.62 Chapter 8 provides an important lesson: comparative
constitutional law should attend to matters of structure no less than to
matters of substantive law. It really is not possible to fully or properly
understand particular substantive constitutional commitments free and clear
of the institutional context-and constraints-in which they operate. Even
so, borrowing in the context of structure might be less useful because
structure can be particularly local.63
Chapter 9 closes the book and revisits the lessons of the preceding
eight chapters, with particular attention to the relationship of domestic and
international law. Even in this context, Jackson does not adopt a posture of
unbridled advocacy of transnational engagement (or "monism," the
creation and maintenance of a single integrated system of international law
within and between nation-states). In this chapter, as in the preceding
chapters, Jackson remains unfailingly objective in presenting and critiquing
arguments for and against courts reaching outside their domestic legal
systems when interpreting domestic law. It is clear, however, that Jackson
believes that judges would be more effective if they remained open to the
benefits and possibilities of engagement with comparative and international
legal norns.6 4 As she puts it, "a posture of engagement seems on the whole
best suited to the task of interpreting the U.S. Constitution in the early
decades of this twenty-first century."65
Even if, at the end of the day, one remains unconvinced of the potential
merits of transnational engagement, Professor Jackson musters powerful
and persuasive evidence in support of her central thesis that no nation can
really completely isolate itself from the larger world, nor can a domestic
legal system achieve perfect integration with the larger global legal
community. Instead, discrete questions and contexts will substantially
affect the viability and importance of transnational judicial engagement.
Neither radical isolation nor radical integration will prove tenable in all
times and all places.
In sum, rather than making a categorical, but ultimately unpersuasive
claim about transnational judicial engagement, Jackson instead makes a
series of limited, well-supported claims about the promise, and limits, of
integrating legal systems across national lines. Her "raging moderation"
(for lack of a better descriptive turn of phrase) represents a welcome
antidote to the robust advocacy scholarship that populates this field. Her
conclusion, that both the desirability and feasibility of transnational
62. See Tushnet, Some Cautionary Notes, supra note 33, at 650-5 1; see also Lucas, supra note
56, at 1996-98, 2001-06.
63. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 227-32.
64. Id. at 153-54, 158-59, 253-58, 278-85.
65. Id. at 159.
2014] 119
Alabama Law Review
borrowing and engagement depend critically on the specific legal question
at issue, in tandem with the context in which the issue arises, needs to be
addressed by advocates of more polar solutions to these questions.
II. FACTORS LIKELY TO INFLUENCE A NATIONAL JUDICIARY'S CHOICE
AMONG POSITIONS OF RESISTANCE, CONVERGENCE, AND ENGAGEMENT
An important initial question, antecedent o considering whether judges
in the United States should embrace engagement more fully, involves the
conditions that make engagement a more attractive posture (whether
normative, jurisprudential, or practical). In other words, what factors might
make judges within a national judicial system more open to engagement (as
opposed to a posture of resistance)? The presence-or absence-of these
factors in the United States could significantly impact whether federal and
state court judges could be persuaded to embrace a higher level of
engagement with comparative and international law. This part considers
practical and jurisprudential reasons that might motivate a national
judiciary to pursue engagement.
A. Self-Interest and Convergence
In some cases, a national judiciary's choice among the paradigms of
resistance, convergence, and engagement might not be entirely voluntary.
Geopolitical realities undoubtedly will strongly influence some nations'
decisions to commit more fully and completely to engagement, if not
convergence, in pursuit of rational self-interest. At the same time, however,
support for higher levels of convergence and engagement clearly does not
depend on geopolitical necessities-many powerful nations, such as
Germany, are advocates of greater efforts to harmonize human rights norms
across national boundaries (both in Europe and globally).66 It also bears
noting that iconic U.S. legal scholars, such as Professors Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Harold Koh, have argued aggressively in favor of a general
posture of convergence-both in the United States and globally.67
Thus, it would be unduly simplistic to posit that postures of
convergence or engagement are solely the province of nations that
generally lack the power to impose their will directly on their global
neighbors. At the same time, however, necessity could be a powerful
incentive toward engagement (and perhaps even convergence).
66. See Dieter Kastrup, From Nuremberg to Rome and Beyond: The Fight Against Genocide, War
Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118,1142 (2008).
67. See Slaughter, supra note 33; Koh, supra note 33.
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Consider the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Over the
centuries, these polities have faced domination and control by Russia, to
the east, or Germany (Prussia), to the west.69 From the vantage point of a
minor European power in a Europe dominated by the major powers,
working to secure greater levels of convergence and cooperation across
national boundaries would make perfect sense. In this context, then,
advocacy of convergence (or engagement) does not represent a profound
moral commitment so much as a strategy for successful national survival.
Professor Jackson posits that necessity, or national self-interest, might
in part help to explain Canada's enthusiasm for efforts to integrate legal
systems across national boundaries. "Geopolitical factors also account for
some differences in orientation between U.S. and Canadian judges."70 She
adds that "as a smaller power [than the United States], Canada may have
greater incentives to be aware of and concerned with what judges in other
countries say and think than do those who identify with the power of the
United States."n She cautions that this argument rests in part on
"contestable assumptions," but nevertheless accepts that "there are a
number of possible mechanisms by which judges might identify with the
power or prestige of their countries, especially insofar as it affects the
prestige of their own offices."72
Thus, national self-interest could significantly influence the decision to
advocate convergence or engagement, rather than resistance. But this does
not mean that the decision will inevitably reflect solely concerns related to
the relative power of a particular polity. Necessity can be a sufficient
condition to incent a posture favoring convergence or engagement, but it
surely is not a necessary or essential condition.
France and Germany, for example, could easily adopt postures of
resistance to convergence (or engagement), but instead have both worked
assiduously to advance the cause of European unity through the institutions
of the European Economic Community (EEC), now styled the European
Union (EU). To be sure, France and Germany vie for influence within the
EU, but in recent times their national governments, consistently have
advanced the project of European integration.
68. See ANDRES KASEKAMP, A HISTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES, at viii-xi (2010); ANDREJS
PLAKANS, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES, at xiii-xiv, 300-329 (2011).
69. KEVIN O'CONNOR, THE HISTORY OF THE BALTIC STATES 2-7, 18-19, 26-30, 33-39, 56-63,
107-22 (2003).
70. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 240.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Terence Fokas, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe: The Legal Framework and
Implications for Contractual Obligations, 36 TEX. J. BUS. L. 2, 5, 15 (1999); see also Desmond Dinan,




The United States, by way of contrast, has never seemed much inclined
or interested in advancing transnational legal values. The U.S. Senate
famously refused to ratify President Woodrow Wilson's charter for the
League of Nations,74 the precursor entity to the United Nations. So too,
congressional support for the United Nations and its institutions has waxed
and waned over time-with a skeptical (hostile?) posture predominating.75
To a very large degree, the federal courts simply mirror the larger attitude
of the general citizenry toward integrating U.S. law and legal institutions
with either the regional or global communities. Deep-seated cultural beliefs
and practices inform and support the contemporary hostility toward
convergence and engagement;76 accordingly, changing the posture of the
U.S. federal and state courts will be tremendously difficult.
I do not claim that "borrowing" across jurisdictions is something that
U.S. judges simply refuse to do. Indeed, with respect to developing the
common law of tort, property, and contract, state supreme courts routinely
engage each other's work-directly and above the line. So too, we lack any
system of intercircuit precedent within the lower federal courts; the
precedent of one U.S. court of appeals does not bind any other courts of
appeals.77 Yet, when cases arise presenting questions of first impression in
one circuit, the practice of federal appellate judges is to cite, discuss, and
engage the decisions of sister circuits (whether or not they ultimately agree
with the decision or decisions). In other words, there is nothing
particularly foreign to standard U.S. legal advocacy or practice about
bringing non-binding, persuasive authority to the attention of a court. In
fact, borrowing is commonplace in both the federal and state court
systems.7 9
74. See JOHN MILTON COOPER, BREAKING THE HEART OF THE WORLD: WOODROW WILSON AND
THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2001).
75. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch, The Interface of National Constitutional Systems with
International Law and Institutions on Using Military Forces: Changing Trends in Executive and
Legislative Powers, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39, 49 (Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2002) ("The congressional attitude toward UN
commitments has been at best skeptical and at worst hostile."). Congress also has undercut U.N.
initiatives "by failing to appropriate funds for assessed obligations and has busied itself with proposals
to restrict the president's flexibility in relation to UN military activities." Id.
76. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 240-43.
77. See Mary Garvery Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts by
Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REv. 605, 608-10 (2003);
Martha C. Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REv. 535,
536-40 (2010); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REv. 1137, 1143-47 (2012).
78. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); Aldens, Inc. v. Miller,
610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1980); Algero, supra note 77, at 610.
79. See Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J.
2096, 2134 (2010).
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But, the source of the materials being consulted seems to matter a great
deal. Citing the decision of another state supreme court or federal appellate
court simply is not the same as citing the work of a juridical body working
outside the United States. Foreign courts lack any political accountability
(whether to a state government or to the President and Senate);80 indeed,
most lawyers and judges do not possess any inkling of how judges are
appointed in other countries (including our immediate North American
neighbors, Canada and Mexico).8' Moreover, most U.S. lawyers, judges,
and legal academics know virtually nothing about the basic organization of
judicial systems in other nations.82 For example, are judges of the
provincial courts in Canada selected by the provincial or national
parliaments? And, does Canada maintain a unitary or dual system of courts
(i.e., are the provincial courts integrated with, or separate from, the national
courts in Canada)?83
Neither a U.S. judge nor lawyer should be eager to cite an opinion from
a jurisdiction when she does not have even a rudimentary grasp of the
court's function, jurisdiction, and composition. Thus, it might be
tremendously useful to consider the opinions of the Alberta Court of
Appeals on the question of quantum meruit; yet, for some very sound
80. See Alford, Constitutional Comparativism, supra note 33, at 698 ("While our judges have a
certain democratic legitimacy, foreign and international judges have none."). Alford explains that
although "all domestic judicial decisions have a certain degree of democratic legitimacy, foreign judges
have no democratic legitimacy." Id. at 710. He also objects that foreign court and international tribunal
jurists are "[i]mmune to the democratically corrective forces of judicial election or executive
nomination" with "no democratic check that the United States can impose upon the rulemaking power
of foreign courts." Id.
81. See Krotoszynski, supra note 31, at 1340-41 (noting that even sophisticated and highly
engaged judges appear to suffer from a "lack of familiarity with the means of selection, composition,
rules of procedure, institutional duties, and institutional character of the various constitutional courts" in
other polities and positing that this fact "raises some serious problems for the project of international
judicial dialogue"). In other words, "[i]f you do not know a court's jurisdiction, its operating rules, or
the effect of its precedents, how can you realistically 'borrow' its precedents?" Id. at 1340.
82. Of course, this lack of institutional knowledge also holds true with respect to the selection of
state court judges within state judicial systems, and yet differences in the judicial selection process
(election versus direct gubernatorial or legislative appointment), retention methodologies, and terms of
office do not seem to impede or discourage borrowing among and between state court systems. Nor do
differences in the operating rules of such courts-for example, whether a particular state supreme court
may issue advisory opinions in reference cases. Accordingly, the importance of knowing about the
structural details and operating rules of a judicial system do not seem to be absolute prerequisites to
successfully borrowing exogenous legal rules and reasoning.
83. Professor Jackson provides answers to these questions-although Canada nominally has
provincial courts, judges of these courts are appointed by the federal, not provincial, governments.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 238. The provinces create the provincial courts "but their judges are
appointed by the federal government." Id. I strongly suspect that most U.S. lawyers, judges, and legal
academics could not identify the jurisdiction or manner of appointment to the Provincial Courts of
Appeals in Canada-or the more general structure and operation of the Canadian judiciary. For a
comprehensive discussion of the structure of the Canadian judiciary, see How the Courts Are
Organized, Gov'T OF CAN., DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-
min/pub/ccs-ajc/page3.html.
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reasons, U.S. judges, on both the federal and state courts, are not likely to
be willing to engage Canadian contract law.84
Jackson argues, quite cogently, that "[c]onsistent with a posture of
engagement" a "graduated approach" should be possible, "one that does not
treat foreign or international law as an undifferentiated mass to be either
rejected or embraced, that is open to both positive and 'aversive' uses of
foreign law or experience, and that is sensitive to the varying normative
contexts of both the domestic issue and the foreign or international
source."85 But, for this approach to work, a nation that does not deem itself
dependent on transnational legal cooperation would have to view the
upside of engaging in the process as sufficient to invest the substantial time
and energy required to understand, critique, and apply or distinguish
foreign and international law when deciding important domestic legal
questions. These practical problems, in turn, invite careful consideration of
the possible rationales for embracing engagement beyond enlightened self-
interest or necessity.
B. Possible Substantive Rationales for Embracing Engagement
Even if national self-interest does not push a domestic court system
toward either a posture of convergence or engagement, courts might be
inclined to look outside their national boundaries when important insights
could be obtained by considering relevant foreign and international law
materials. Jackson notes, for example, that many constitutional courts use
the concept of balancing to reconcile claims arising from fundamental
rights with conflicting claims by the community, expressed by a
democratically-elected legislature, to set limits on individual autonomy.
"Courts or tribunals in Canada, Colombia, Germany, the European Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, India, Ireland, Israel, South
Africa, and elsewhere invoke the concept of proportionality to review not
only the propriety of sanctions, but also the legality of a wide range of
government conduct."8 6 Only if the rule is "proportionate," or adequately
justified by advancing the government's interest to the extent that it
84. The example is not entirely arbitrary. As it happens, there might be some benefit in
considering the Canadian understanding of quantum meruit in thinking about the concept here in the
United States. Although the doctrine in both nations shares common legal roots in English precedents,
contemporary Canadian common law tends to treat quantum meruit primarily as a freestanding
principle of restitutionary equity neither closely nor necessarily linked to contract law at all. See G.H.L.
Fridman, Quantum Meruit, 37 ALTA L. REv. 38, 42-46 (1999) (arguing that contemporary Canadian
law is primarily rooted in restitutionary principles rather than quasi-contract).
85. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 183.
86. Id. at 60.
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burdens or impedes the underlying substantive right, will the government
prevail.87
Jackson notes that Canada's landmark case on undertaking
proportionality review, R. v. Oakes,88 has been highly influential in other
jurisdictions that use a balancing approach when deciding constitutional
claims.89 Borrowing from a jurisdiction with common procedural design
elements seems both natural and unobjectionable.
Moreover, in some nations, the local constitution itself requires that
domestic courts, including the highest constitutional court, take account of
international or comparative law relevant to questions arising under local
law. South Africa provides perhaps the best example of this approach. The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa expressly provides that
"[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - (a) must
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law;
and (c) may consider foreign law." 90 Thus, the South African people have
elected to pursue a position of convergence on a voluntary basis.
Even in South Africa, however, "[t]he requirement is procedural, not
substantive: the courts must consider international law, but the constitution
does not require conformance."91 Although section 39 does not bind the
South African Constitutional Court to pursue convergence regardless of the
local values at stake, the constitution plainly authorizes the South African
justices to interpret South African law in a way that advances the project of
more uniform global law. Moreover, some constitutions require that the
local constitution be interpreted consistently with international and foreign
law. 92
Professor Jackson posits that concrete limits will constrain a national
judiciary's commitment to pursuing engagement (or convergence). Indeed,
she argues that a position of complete convergence simply is not tenable,
even if the local constitution authorizes consideration of foreign and
international law. She explains that "[c]onvergence, if any, can only be
partial, and its dynamic character will require a more complex
87. See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
(2012).
88. R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). For an extended discussion and analysis of the
Oakes decision, see RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 41-48 (2006).
89. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 61.
90. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39, cl. 1.
91. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 78; see also State v. Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR I (CC) at 27
para. 39 (S. Afr.) ("We can derive assistance from public international law and foreign case law, but we
are in no way bound to follow it.").
92. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 325 n.45.
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interpretative approach than may at first glance appear."93 Jackson adds
that "the dynamic nature of both constitutional law and international law
suggests that an end-state of convergence is unachievable and indeed,
might be unhealthy for the development of both constitutional law and
international law." 94  This is so because "[n]ew rights or new
understandings of old rights will emerge, new claims will be made, and
new social movements will arise, leading to new mobilizations for changes
in understandings."95
Even in nations that voluntarily embrace the project of convergence
"these postures will in all likelihood function as rebuttable presumptions, in
order to allow for national distinctiveness in particular areas."9 6 Jackson
cautions that "there is far more to good constitutional interpretation than
simply going along; interpretation must remain rooted in national text,
precedents, purposes, ethos, and history."97 Moreover, "[t]he legitimacy of
looking to international or foreign law or experience will vary with the
domestic issue, depending on the specificity and history of our
constitutional text, the degree to which the issue is genuinely unsettled, and
the strength of other interpretative sources."98
Thus, it is simply not possible to endorse borrowing in all
circumstances or to condemn it in any circumstances; a lighter touch is
required.99 For Jackson, this lighter touch is best represented by a process
of engagement, which implies respectful consideration, but not necessarily
ultimate agreement.
A nation, like Germany, might well voluntarily support a general
posture of convergence because it believes it to be the right thing to do as a
means of advancing the cause of universal human rights, national self-
interest, or perhaps both. It will not, however, do so unfailingly or without
careful reflection.0 0 And, although in the contemporary United States most
judges would shrink from the proposition that they should serve as
advocates of an integrated system of global law, times and attitudes might
93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 68.
95. Id.; see generally Krotoszynski, supra note 31, at 1357 ("In constructing a persuasive
argument, it might well benefit a judge to know which reasons a jurist facing a similar problem found
persuasive and which she did not. Weak form JD could awaken a jurist to arguments that are not self-
evident to someone within a given legal culture.").
96. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 69.
97. Id. at 254.
98. Id. at 162.
99. See Fontana, supra note 33, at 556-74 (arguing that the federal and state courts should adopt
"refined comparativism" as a methodology for integrating comparative law materials into the decisional
process in domestic constitutional law cases and positing that doing so would improve the quality of
domestic constitutional law).
100. Id. at 612-13.
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change; at some point, a posture of greater openness to intentionally
making U.S. law more consistent with foreign and international law could
emerge. In any event, the fact that nations with vibrant economies and
robust military forces choose to embrace the project of convergence
suggests that advocacy of this posture need not solely arise from necessity.
C The Presence (or Absence) of Transnational Juridical Bodies and
Engagement
One potentially important factor for predicting whether a particular
domestic legal system will embrace engagement might be the presence of
important transnational juridical entities with whom the domestic national
courts will engage in dialogue. For example, for member states of the
European Union, it is simply impossible to ignore the relevant decisions of
the European Court of Justice, the highest judicial tribunal within the
European Union.0 ' Similarly, for nations that are members of the Council
of Europe, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
will have tremendous local importance. If judges, lawyers, law professors,
and law students all routinely access and consider the relationship of
transnational judicial decisions to their domestic law, they are more likely
to be open to considering the law of other nations as well.
In part, this approach simply reflects the fact that the jurisprudence of
the ECHR takes into account and incorporates pan-European human rights
values. Although local member states are generally entitled to a "margin of
appreciation" in construing and applying European Convention rights,102
the substantive scope and content of these rights are constructed with
reference to the domestic law practices of member states;103 practices once
commonplace within a particular polity might well have to give way if
other nations conclude that a particular practice (e.g., the death penalty
04
101. See Grimm, supra note 14, at 232.
102. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 753-54, paras.
47-49, 54, 56-57 (1976); Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, paras.
207-214 (1978); HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE
DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 12-24 (1996); THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1-94 (Pieter Van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
103. See Onder Bakircioglu, The Application ofthe Margin ofAppreciation Doctrine in Freedom
of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GER. L.J. 711, 711 (2007) ("Margin of appreciation is
based on the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in balancing individual rights and
national interests, as well as in resolving conflicts that emerge as a result of diverse moral
convictions.").
104. See Eur. Consult. Ass., Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, as Amended by Protocol
No. 11, art. 1, Doc. No. 114 (1983) ("The death penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned
to such penalty or executed.").
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or corporal punishment05) transgresses a European Convention right. In a
polity where domestic law must operate in the shadow of transnational
regional law, it might well make less sense to adopt a "go it alone"
approach; insofar as the community's consensus will ultimately bind all
individual members, it would behoove domestic judges to articulate with
clarity a jurisdiction's policy preferences and to engage with the work of
other juridical bodies when so doing. Simply put, persuasion will be needed
if the local legal norm is to endure.
Judges in the United States, for the most part, lack this sort of external
audience and therefore operate free and clear of this practical constraint.
Indeed, in most cases, the United States "wins" regardless of whether a
particular approach to framing a human right enjoys salience beyond the
United States; this is so because the United States is not accountable to any
transnational juridical entities. Indeed, even in circumstances where an
obvious need for uniform interpretation of a transnational legal text exists,
as is the case with respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,106 the Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that it
will read treaties adopted into U.S. law wholly independently of
international juridical bodies, such as the International Court of Justice (a
United Nations entity).10 7
By way of contrast, a German or French judge articulating a human
rights norm must bear in mind the possibility that her work could be
displaced by transnational courts whose decisions Germany or France must
abide (whether they like them or not).108 Influence in a polycentric judicial
105. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1978) (holding that
corporal punishment constitutes "degrading punishment" prohibited under the European Convention
and declining to apply the margin of appreciation to save it from invalidation).
106. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 59 U.N.T.S.
261; see also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
107. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522-23 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 354 (2006); see also Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007) (discussing the
interplay between domestic and international law in the U.S. federal courts).
108. For example, the German Federal Constitutional Court's attempt to reconcile a right to
freedom of speech and press with protection of privacy and personal dignity was rejected by the ECHR.
See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 50, 57-58. The publication of three sets of
photographs was at issue in Von Hannover, including photographs of Princess Caroline having lunch at
a French restaurant with an actor, riding a horse, with her children, shopping, riding a bicycle, skiing,
playing tennis, and at a beach. See id. at 48-50. The ECHR found that Germany had failed to provide
adequate protection of Princess Caroline's privacy. See id. at 72-73 ("[I]n the Court's opinion the
criteria established by the domestic courts were not sufficient to ensure the effective protection of the
applicant's private life and she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a 'legitimate
expectation' of protection of her private life."). Von Hannover thus involves a positive obligation on the
part of Germany to regulate private behavior more effectively to secure privacy interests in
contemporary society. The ECHR acknowledged this aspect of the dispute, noting that signatories to the
European Convention incur legal obligations that "may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves." Id.
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environment entails attempting to move the consensus toward your
domestic point of view; the fact that particular reasons are sufficiently
persuasive to one national court system says precisely nothing about
whether other judicial systems will concur. Engagement in this context
simply represents a prudent means of ensuring that a particular national
judiciary's views contribute to the development of the transnational
consensus that all member states within the European Union or the Council
of Europe ultimately will have to observe.109
III. LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGEMENT
As noted in the preceding Part, the ability of judges and lawyers to
participate in transnational engagement requires that those staffing the
courts and law offices have competence in comparative and international
law materials and research. And, given the real-world constraints that
judges and practicing lawyers face with respect to their time, these skills
would need to be incorporated as part of a standard domestic legal
education. To be sure, we have seen some movement in this general
direction. For example, several law schools have incorporated a mandatory
course in public international law into the first-year curriculum. 10 Even so,
if comparative and international law remain "boutique" offerings-
enhancements to the more general domestic law fare-then graduates of
U.S. law schools will not be equipped to pursue the kind of engagement
that Jackson posits would enhance and improve the quality of U.S. law and
judicial reasoning.
at 68. However, in a recent subsequent case involving the very same petitioner, the ECHR permitted
greater freedom to publish pictures of Princess Caroline, notwithstanding her claim that publication of
the photographs would violate her Article 8 privacy rights. See Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2),
2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 399, 442-45. Strictly speaking, however, the ECHR did not resile from its legal
analysis in Von Hannover (No. 1) that even government officials and public figures may invoke the
protection of Article 8. Accordingly, the legal rule set forth in Von Hannover (No. 1) that privacy rights
will trump speech and press rights when necessary to secure personal privacy, and in the absence of a
demonstrable connection between the information sought to be disclosed and the process of democratic
self-government, remains in force and effect.
109. See PIETER VAN DI.K & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 3-40, 71-96 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the interrelationship between the domestic legal
systems of members of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence of the ECHR). In this regard, it
also bears noting that the ECHR has held that "[g]enerally speaking, the margin enjoyed by the States
[is] broader where there was no European consensus." Von Hannover (No. 2), 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at
430.
110. See, e.g., First-Year Course Descriptions, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. OF LAW,
http://law.wlu.edu/academics/page.asp?pageid=1100 (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). Another common
approach is to offer an international or comparative law offering as a first-year elective, usually as one
of a small group of 1L elective courses taken in the spring semester. See, e.g., Curriculum: Degree
Requirements, AM. U. WASH. C. OF LAW, http://www.wel.american.edu/admiss/curriculum.cfm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2014).
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In fact, in her book Professor Jackson does not much emphasize the
importance of legal education to enabling lawyers and judges to adopt a
posture of engagement with foreign and international law."' Yet, it seems
to me that effective engagement would require a cohort of lawyers and
judges who view arguments grounded in foreign and international law as
legitimate and who also have the skills necessary to create arguments
premised on these sources; lawyers who lack the ability to engage in
international or comparative law research are unlikely to proffer arguments
premised on these materials."l2 Accordingly, if the United States is to adopt
a stronger posture of active engagement (as Jackson advocates), U.S. law
schools would need to do a better job of inculcating the skill sets necessary
to research, write, and argue legal positions premised on foreign and
international law. At the same time, however, there is good cause to
question whether U.S. law schools will embrace this project with alacrity.
A. Most U.S. Law Schools Offer Only a Limited Comparative Law
Curriculum
At present, beyond a basic survey course in comparative law-a course
that generally surveys the civil law system as implemented on the continent
of Europe-most U.S. law schools make little, if any, effort to inculcate the
skill sets that would be needed for U.S. lawyers to use foreign and
international law as a standard part of their professional toolkit. To be sure,
exceptions to this general state of affairs exist. For example, Tulane Law
School offers a dual track of legal training in the common law or the civil
law tradition.'13 This reflects the unique nature of Louisiana as a primarily
civil law jurisdiction (for state law matters) within a larger common law
polity;114 simply put, attorneys practicing within the Louisiana state courts
111. Jackson does make a passing reference to the maintenance of bijural legal education in
Canada, which includes formal study of both the common law and civil law systems. JACKSON, supra
note 1, at 242.
112. Cf Law & Chang, supra note 2, at 558-63, 575-77 (explaining in some detail how and why
judges of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court consider, in an informal way, foreign and international
law when deciding domestic constitutional law claims and noting that these judges and their clerks
often have studied foreign law abroad).
113. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Napoleon Code or Complex?, 15 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 95, 95
(2000) ("Since the founding of the Tulane Law School, its deans and professors have consistently
extolled the inestimable advantages and opportunities afforded by a dual curriculum that bridges the
common law/civil law divide. We have argued that our students, from whatever state they may
originate, may absorb a far wider legal culture than their counterparts in other states and that this kind
of legal education will be increasingly prized in a global society.").
114. See I KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 119-21
(Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d rev. ed. 1987). But see VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE
LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION (2005)
(arguing that, although Louisiana retains significant aspects of a civil law jurisdiction, important
common law concepts also exist in contemporary Louisana law); Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea ofMixed
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must know and understand the civil law tradition. It also seems quite likely
that Tulane law students on the common law track have a much greater
consciousness of the civil law tradition-and its salient characteristics-
than do law students at most U.S. law schools. In this sense, then, law
students on both tracks at Tulane would be better able to facilitate the
process of dialogue and engagement that Jackson advocates.
But Tulane is, if not unique, then very much close to it in putting
substantial institutional resources into a civil law curriculum. Even if one
considers other law schools in Louisiana, the number of U.S. law schools
investing major resources into a thoroughly comparative curriculum
represents a very small percentage of the total number of U.S. law schools.
Moreover, in the current economic environment, resources for new
programs are scarce, and many law schools are focused on making
substantial reductions to entering class sizes, enhancing skills training to
make graduates more practice ready, and improving the operation of career
services offices. Some law schools, such as those at Arizona State
University'15 and George Washington University,'6 have even begun to
employ a large percentage of their graduating classes in "path to practice"
programs meant to help subsidize and also facilitate the transition from law
student to practicing lawyer. Law schools face significant resource
constraints, and making the case for major new investments in international
and comparative law offerings strikes me as a (very) heavy lift. Enhancing
such offerings would, of course, be a laudable decision, but as a resource
commitment in a time of very tight law school (and university) budgets, an
effort of this sort probably would not be at the top of most decanal or
faculty priority lists.
Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 8 (2003) (positing that Louisiana and Quebec could best be
categorized as "mixed" civil law and common law jurisdictions).
115. See Matthew Iglesias, ASU Launching a Law Firm to Employ Unemployable Law School
Graduates, SLATE MAG., (Mar. 7, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2013/03/07/asu launchinga__lawfirm to employ unemployablelaw school_graduates.html
(reporting on "a nonprofit law firm that Arizona State is setting up this summer for some of its
graduates"). Under the ASU plan, "[o]ver the next few years, 30 graduates will work under seasoned
lawyers and be paid for a wide range of services provided at relatively low cost to the people of
Phoenix." Id.
116. See Liza Dee & Cory Weinberg, In Dim Job Market, Law School Pays More Graduates to
Work, GW HATCHET, Feb. 7, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/07/in-dim-
job-market-law-school-pays-more-graduates-to-work/ ("More than one-fifth of Class of 2012 [GWU
law] graduates are part of the Pathways to Practice program - an initiative that pays alumni $15 an hour
to work 35 hours a week to gain experience."). The GWU Law program was embroiled in controversy
when then-dean Paul Schiff Berman attempted to reduce the hourly rate of pay mid-stream from $15
per hour to $10 per hour, ostensibly to encourage participating GWU law graduates to find other, full-
time employment-a policy change that he quickly abandoned. See Elie Mystal, George Washington
University Law School Reverses Course, Restores Funding for Unemployed Grads Program,
ABOVETHELAW, (June 20, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/06/george-washington-
university-law-reverses-course-restore-funding/ ("Last night, after an outcry from students (and some
bad press), Dean Berman changed his mind and decided to restore funding to the $15 per hour level.").
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There is also something of a chicken-and-egg problem at work here.
Law schools do not invest major esources in international and comparative
law offerings in part because domestic legal employers do not place much
value on such training.'17 This is true not only of law firms, but also of
government agencies, federal and state judges hiring law clerks, and
corporate general counsel offices. This lack of interest likely relates to the
lack of interest most federal and state judges have demonstrated, at least to
date, in hearing arguments premised on these materials. If comparative and
international law materials were persuasive and helped advocates to win
hard cases for their clients, more legal employers would value these skills,
and law schools would, in turn, commit more resources to inculcating these
skills in their students.
Professor Jackson notes that, in Canada, "[m]any law students are
'bijural,' learning both civil law and common law traditions.""'8 Relatedly,
she also observes that "[w]hether cause, effect, or both, legal education in
Canada is more comparatively and internationally oriented."ll9 In other
words, the Canadian legal education system facilitates engagement by
inculcating the practical skills required to engage in advocacy that
incorporates comparative and international perspectives, but Canadian legal
education also fosters the theoretical habits of mind that encourage this turn
in legal advocacy. The fact that Canadian courts, notably including the
Supreme Court of Canada, routinely cite-and even discuss-foreign and
international law sources also creates a powerful incentive for advocates to
incorporate these materials in their written briefs and oral arguments.120
Professor Jackson observes that "[t]he Supreme Court of Canada is
more inclined to refer, without apology, to foreign and international legal
material, and to discuss these materials at some length, than is its
counterpart in the United States."'21 This constitutes a powerful, indeed
compelling, signal to the entire Canadian legal establishment o focus time,
attention, and energy on comparative and international law if they wish to
be effective lawyers. In the United States, the signals sent by the federal
117. Of course, one could reasonably conclude that the problem relates to the U.S. judiciary's
seeming lack of interest in comparative and international law materials; if domestic courts were to
signal that they wished to be briefed on comparative and international law as a matter of course, law
schools would respond by providing the requisite training. However, I think U.S. legal education's
relative lack of attention to comparative and international law produces judges who are incurious about
such authority. In this sense, then, there is a chicken-and-egg problem at work.
118. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 69.
119. Id.
120. See id. As Professor Jackson otes, "[w]hile the Canadian court has its own divisions, a
significant number of constitutional opinions look to practices of other free and democratic societies."
Id. at 87.
121. Id. at 87.
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and state courts are, if anything, diametrically opposed to the citation of
comparative and international law materials.
Consider the recent Medellin1 22 case, in which the Supreme Court of
the United States refused to give much credence to the authoritative
pronouncement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the
meaning and requirements of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Vienna Convention).12 3 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John
Roberts declined to give any interpretative deference to the ICJ's
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, even though the Vienna
Convention specifies that the ICJ is to enjoy interpretative primacy over its
meaning and enforcement and despite the obvious need for uniformity in
the rules governing the conduct of international diplomacy.12 4
Invoking language rooted in the role of the federal courts set forth in
Marbury v. Madison,'2 5 the Supreme Court held that although treaties are
the "supreme law of the land," their meaning, at least in domestic law
terms, should be determined directly and authoritatively by the federal
courts.12 6 The Medellin Court went on to reject a claim under the Vienna
Convention that had been embraced by the ICJ-in a case involving
Medellin.127
This sort of judicial reasoning sends a clear and unequivocal message
to lawyers, law professors, and law students: the decisions of international
tribunals simply do not matter-or do not matter very much-in construing
federal law, including treaties. Professor Jackson certainly acknowledges
the existence of this problem and even discusses the precise problem of the
Supreme Court refusing to credit either the judgments or reasoning of the
ICJ in cases arising under the Vienna Convention.128
Discussing an earlier case, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,'29 Jackson
observes that "[w]hile the Court acknowledged the need to give 'respectful
122. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
123. See id. at 512-13, 517-19, 522-23; see also Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
supra note 106. Chief Justice Roberts explained that "[i]n sum, while the ICJ's judgment in Avena
creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force
constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas
petitions." Medellin, 552 U.S. at 522-23.
124. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ICJ's
interpretation in the Avena case should be deemed binding on the question of mandatory consular
access).
125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.").
126. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 505.
127. Id. The earlier decision, largely ignored by the Medellin majority, was Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) [hereinafter Avena].
128. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 121, 175-76.
129. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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consideration' to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment, it
engaged with the ICJ's reasoning about the treaty only to a limited
extent."l3 0 Moreover, she concedes, in the context of Medellin, that "the
Court gave relatively little weight to the ICJ decision itself," a decision that
"involved a defendant whose particular situation had been before the ICJ in
the Avena case."l31
The signaling effect of decisions of this sort is profound and constitutes
a strong headwind against any serious efforts to remake domestic law
school curricula to emphasize the importance and relevance of comparative
and international law. For such reforms to secure broad-based support
within the legal academy, federal and state courts would need to signal not
antipathy toward arguments grounded in these materials, but rather alacrity
in receiving them. To date, however, the most charitable adjective that one
could fairly use to describe the posture of federal and state judges toward
comparative and international law is one of indifference-and a more
accurate adjective might be "hostility."
B. The Relevance ofForeign Language Skills to Judicial Engagement
Across Legal Cultures
The problem with teaching comparative law in the domestic law school
curriculum relates, at least in part, to the lack of foreign language skills in
the United States. In the United States, monolinguism is the norm, rather
than the exception.132 Obviously, if most U.S. lawyers were multilingual,
this would enhance the prospects for successful projects of transnational
judicial engagement. To be sure, as Professor Jackson argues, more foreign
and international juridical bodies are providing English-language
translations of their decisions;'33 it is certainly true that "[i]ncreasing
numbers of foreign courts provide translations of their decisions into
English."3 4
Other potential fixes to overcoming language barriers exist. For
example, "[a]nother approach would rely on court or library personnel to
improve justices' knowledge of foreign laws; some constitutional courts
now routinely hire foreign lawyers to work as law clerks." 35 Presumably
language competencies are one benefit of such hiring practices. However,
these strike me as second-best solutions.
130. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 121.
131. Id. at 176.
132. Michael Erard, Are We Really Monolingual?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at SRI2.
133. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 6-9.
134. Id. at 5-6.
135. Id. at 189.
134 [Vol. 66:1:105
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
If a polity were truly committed to engaging with the wider world, it
would provide the tools necessary for this process as a standard part of its
primary and secondary educational programs. Consider, for example,
Norway. Norwegian school children are often not merely educated to be
bilingual, but rather trilingual: Norwegians, generally, can read and speak
Norwegian, English, and either German or French.13 6 The reason for this is
simple: the Norwegian people have concluded that having a multilingual
populace will enhance their prospects for successfully engaging the larger
world. Transnational engagement is hardly limited to the law-indeed,
business and commerce seem equally, if not more, promising as candidates
for this process because such engagement can lead to direct improvements
to national wealth.
Norway is blessed with rich natural resources (North Sea oil, to give a
specific example) and could probably adopt a more isolationist stance.
Larger historical factors, including successive periods of domination by its
Scandinavian neighbors to the east (Sweden) and south (Denmark)
undoubtedly have helped to create a socio-legal culture that places a high
value on independent relationships with the wider world.37 Today, of
course, Norway's independence is not seriously threatened. Yet, the
general political culture retains its commitment to global engagement and
creating a citizenry capable of it-and, even if the root cause for this
posture has (thankfully) passed away into the history books, the economic,
political, and cultural benefits of being capable of engaging other polities,
quite literally in their own language, continues to pay significant dividends
to Norway and the Norwegian people.
Historical factors can often explain a relatively robust commitment o
bilingualism. Canada, for example, constitutes a federated state that marries
a population of Anglophones with a population of Francophones.13 8 Much
of contemporary Canadian government structure relates back to the United
Kingdom's defeat of France on the Plains of Abraham, outside Quebec
136. See Norwegian Univ. of Sci. & Tech., The Norwegian Language, NORWEGIAN ON THE WEB,
http://www.ntnu.edu/now/intro/background-norwegian (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) ("Today, English is
Norway's most important foreign language for international use, followed by German and French.").
137. THOMAS K. DERRY, A HISTORY OF SCANDINAVIA: NORWAY, SWEDEN, DENMARK,
FINLAND, AND ICELAND 31-32, 110, 151-52, 217, 268-72 (1979) (noting political control of Norway
by both Denmark and Sweden); NORWEGIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN, NORWAY: A FEW FACTS
FROM NORWEGIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS 9-24 (2d ed. 1905) (euphemistically discussing Norway's
"union" with Denmark and then with Sweden and with respect to the latter observing that "a feeling that
the union was a misfortune for Norway" began to spread in the late eighteenth century). Denmark was
an ally of Napoleon; as part of the terms of his defeat, the Treaty of Kiel (1814) forced Denmark to cede
Norway to Sweden as compensation for Sweden's loss of Finland to Russia. Id. at 13. This involuntary
annexation by Sweden was not popular with most Norwegians. See id. at 14 ("When news of this [the
annexation] came to Norway, the Norwegians rose in indignation.").
138. SCOTT W. SEE, THE HISTORY OF CANADA 1-89, 155-58 (2001).
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City, on September 13, 1759.139 This historical fact probably has some
explanatory force with respect to Canada's contemporary commitment to
integrating its domestic law with international law, as well as its emphasis
on the importance of multiculturalism more generally;140 as Professor
Jackson argues, "[i]n seeking to understand U.S. and Canadian federalisms,
and how they affect their respective courts' willingness to consider foreign
or international law as relevant in resolving constitutional cases, Canadian
commitments to bilingualism and multiculturalism as they affect legal
education and political culture should not be neglected."1 41
C. Taiwan: An Exemplar and Case Study of the Relevance and
Importance ofLegal Education to the Possibility of Transnational Judicial
Engagement
Professors David S. Law and Wen-Chen Chang have undertaken
important comparative scholarly work that demonstrates quite persuasively
the crucial role and importance of education and language skills in creating
a judicial system capable of effective transnational engagement.142 The
judges of the Constitutional Court of Taiwan often have studied law abroad
and also hire law clerks with similar educational experiences.143 This
educational experience-and competency in working with foreign legal
material-enables judges of the Taiwanese Constitutional Court to engage
foreign law effectively when deciding hard cases.
Law and Chang make an important preliminary point that merits
careful consideration: in order to assess whether a particular national
judiciary embraces transnational judicial engagement, one must be careful
to ask and answer the right questions.144 As it happens, much of the
"dialogue" turns out to be entirely silent: "the concept of 'global judicial
dialogue' neither describes the actual practice of comparative analysis by
judges nor explains the emergence of a global constitutional jurisprudence"
and "the frequency with which a court cites foreign law in its opinions is an
139. Id. at 51-54.
140. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 27 (U.K.) ("This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canada."); R. v.
Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 769 (Can.) (noting "the importance of diversity and multiculturalism in
Canada, the value of equality and the worth and dignity of each human person" within Canadian
constitutional thought); see also Krotoszynski, supra note 88, at 56-57 (discussing the importance of
equality, diversity, and multiculturalism in the free speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of
Canada).
141. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 242.
142. Law & Chang, supra note 2, at 523-25.
143. Id. at 559-62.
144. Id. at 525-28.
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extremely unreliable measure of the extent to which the court actually
makes use of foreign law."1 4 5 Instead, Professors Law and Chang argue that
"[s]cholars who wish to understand or measure a particular court's usage of
foreign law must therefore be prepared to supplement quantitative research
methods, such as statistical analysis of citations to foreign law, with
qualitative approaches that are capable of probing more deeply, such as
interviews with court personnel."1 46 Thus, even though the Constitutional
Court of Taiwan seldom cites foreign legal sources in its formal written
decisions, "foreign legal research forms a routine and indispensable part of
its deliberations."1 4 7
To be sure, "[t]he published opinions of the TCC give the
superficial appearance of a court that makes relatively little use of foreign
law"1 48 and "[a]ctual citation of foreign law is rare, especially in majority
opinions."1 4 9 Nevertheless, the judges of this court consider foreign law in
general, and U.S. law in particular, when deciding hard cases.150 Thus, the
"failure to cite foreign law does not denote failure to consider foreign
law."151
This brings us to the main point at hand: what makes it possible for
Taiwanese constitutional jurists and their law clerks to engage foreign and
international law effectively? Or, as Law and Chang put the question, "how
exactly do the justices and their clerks acquire their extensive knowledge of
foreign law?"' 5 2 They report that "[i]t turns out that, for the most part, they
do so in very old-fashioned ways: they study it in school, they conduct
research, and they talk to their colleagues."5 3
Consistent with Jackson's thesis that staffing decisions can importantly
impact the ability of a court to consider foreign and international law,154
Law and Chang explain that many of the Taiwanese judges and their law
clerks have studied foreign law abroad and rely on this formal training to
conduct research in chambers.155 Moreover, and again as Jackson posits,56
"[w]hat has transformed the way in which Taiwanese justices and clerks
145. Id. at 527.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 528.
148. Id. at 557.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 557-63.
151. Id. at 559.
152. Id. at 563.
153. Id.
154. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 5-9, 189.
155. Law & Chang, supra note 2, at 563 ("Much of this research concerns legal systems to which
the justices and clerks have already been exposed as graduate students: eleven of the fifteen justices
hold either an LL.M. or Ph.D. in law from another country.").
156. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 5-6.
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learn about foreign law is not an expansion of opportunities to interact with
judges in other countries, but rather the increasing availability and utility of
electronic research tools."157
Thus, Taiwanese judges serving on the Constitutional Court evidently
have both the time and the ability to consider, albeit informally, foreign and
international law when deciding important questions of domestic
constitutional law.158 In order to operationalize a strong form of
international judicial dialogue or engagement, however, judges must be
familiar with the sources of foreign law and the institutions charged with
creating and enforcing it. Most U.S. lawyers, judges, and law students have
not studied law abroad and therefore lack the formal training that Law and
Chang report that Taiwanese Constitutional Court judges and law clerks
often possess.
By way of contrast, most U.S. lawyers have at least some general idea
of how state judiciaries function; the same is obviously true with respect to
federal judges regarding the decisions of other federal courts. The condition
does not, however, hold true with respect to foreign or international
courts-even those of our immediate neighbors Canada and Mexico.
The Taiwanese example supports my central claim that stronger
competencies in comparative and international law research would be
required in order for state and federal judges in the United States
comfortably to engage foreign and international legal materials. But judges
facing an overflowing docket are unlikely to have either the time or the
ability to study foreign legal systems in any great detail. If judges are to
possess these skills, they must have them before they come to the bench.
And, the same problems of time and incentive would also impede the
ability of most practicing lawyers to engage in unhurried study of foreign
legal materials (absent an unusual client need for such work). If these skills
are to be acquired and then deployed by U.S. judges and lawyers, they
probably would need to be incorporated, on a comprehensive basis, into the
standard U.S. law school curriculum.
Absent a revolution in curricular priorities, however, domestic judges,
lawyers, and legal academics will almost certainly lack the skill sets
required to embrace transnational engagement. However, and for the
reasons previously noted, the prospects for a radically enhanced focus on
comparative and transnational law in the standard U.S. law school
curriculum are rather bleak. Without some sort of strong signal from
federal and state court judges that legal advocates should devote greater
time and attention to foreign and international law materials in their written
157. Law & Chang, supra note 2, at 563.
158. Id. at 558-62 (discussing in-chambers consideration of foreign and international law by
Taiwanese jurists serving on the Constitutional Court of Tiawan).
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briefs and oral arguments, significantly enhanced levels of transnational
engagement will not come into being in the United States
D. Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Potential for Incorporating
Comparative Law Materials and Methodology More Fully into the U.S.
Domestic Law School Curriculum
Assuming that Professor Jackson is correct to argue that higher mean
levels of engagement would lead to improved judicial reasoning and
decision making, and further assuming that contemporary legal education
does a relatively poor job of equipping lawyers to use foreign and
international law materials in fashioning their arguments, what steps might
be taken to address this failure? The potential benefits associated with
incorporating comparative law and legal perspectives in domestic law
school teaching and scholarship do not rest on a purely utilitarian
argument, but rather on a normative claim: namely, that considering how
another nation, sharing a common set of legal, political, social, and moral
commitments, has addressed a common issue or problem can shed
important new light on old, seemingly settled legal questions.159
If one agrees with this claim, or will at least consider its validity
arguendo, then how would one go about incorporating a comparative legal
perspective into both the domestic law school curriculum and also discrete
courses within that curriculum if one is not otherwise familiar with
comparative law and legal materials? Moreover, and as a preliminary
matter, is comparative law a discrete, upper-level elective course, a
particular methodology, or both? The answer seems obvious: it is plainly
both. Comparative law is both a discrete subject matter and also a
methodology, not unlike law and economics, critical race theory, or
empirical legal studies.
Clearly, it is simply not plausible to suggest that every U.S. law
professor can (or even should) teach either the general survey course in
comparative law or even a more specialized comparative law course (such
as comparative constitutional law). Nevertheless, it would be quite possible
to incorporate comparative law materials and methodologies into one's
teaching and scholarship on domestic law subjects; globalizing can occur
within the existing curriculum.
The question that presents itself, obviously enough, is whether the
game is worth the candle? In other words, do comparative law materials or
methodologies add something that would be worth pursuing, either in the
classroom or in one's scholarship? I would argue that comparative law can
159. See supra notes 30-85 and accompanying text.
Alabama Law Review
significantly enhance and improve the quality, content, and scope of
pedagogy and scholarship involving domestic legal subjects, just as law
and economics, critical race theory, and empirical legal studies can and do
yield important insights into old problems and questions.
As Professor Jackson so cogently argues, 1o comparative law opens up
new windows and vantage points on old problems; familiarity can make an
idiosyncratic answer seem like the inevitable or entirely obvious answer.
When the same question or issue is viewed from a global vantage point,
however, the "familiar" can become quite contestable and the "obvious"
may appear strange or idiosyncratic. Jackson posits that "[fJunctional
comparisons can cast light on how to solve emerging constitutional
problems and provide empirical information relevant to doctrinal questions
that U.S. constitutional law asks, illuminating both more, and less,
successful approaches."16 1 This is no less true for legal education than it is
for deciding the cases and controversies that judges are called upon to
resolve.
In the specific context of a law school classroom setting, comparative
materials can help students appreciate the viability of different answers to
familiar questions.162 For example, is a jury essential to a fair or just
criminal trial? Should constitutional rights apply against the state, or rather
inform all social relations as a binding social norm that defines a polity?1 63
Is consideration a necessary element of a valid contract?
With respect to legal scholarship, one can incorporate comparative
perspectives in the context of primarily domestic law inquiries;
comparative law can help to contextualize scholarly projects that relate to
primarily local or domestic legal questions. In either case, comparative law
materials can facilitate "thinking outside the box"; a foreign legal system
might frame a question in a novel way, adopt a legal test that incorporates
values that are not generally taken into account in the United States, or
160. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 110-17.
161. Id. at 110.
162. See Fontana, supra note 33, at 562-63 (arguing that law schools should invest greater
resources in teaching comparative law and methodology in the basic domestic law school curriculum).
163. In the constitutional jurisprudence of Germany, and also of the ECHR, constitutional rights
do not, strictly speaking, run only against the state. See X & Y v. Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, 8 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 235, 239-42 (1985) (holding that the Netherlands had a duty to secure convention rights
against private abridgement and explaining that this duty extends to "the sphere of the relations of
individuals between themselves"); Krotoszynski, supra note 88, at 98-102 (noting the absence of a state
action limit on constitutional rights protected under the German Basic Law). In consequence, it is not
sufficient for the state itself to refrain from violating fundamental rights; instead, it has a broader duty
to secure these rights within the society. See Dieter Grimm, Human Rights and Judicial Review in
Germany, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 267, 276 (David
M. Beatty ed., 1994) ("In their capacity as objectives, human rights penetrate the whole legal and social
order.").
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place great emphasis on facts and circumstances that are entirely irrelevant
in the governing U.S. legal analysis.
To provide a concrete example, teaching constitutional law or the First
Amendment clearly can involve recourse to comparative examples and use
of comparative law materials; moreover, incorporating such materials could
greatly enhance comprehension and mastery of purely domestic legal rules.
For example, contrasting a presidential system with a parliamentary system
of government yields important insights into the structure of the federal
government and the Framers' obsessive concern with limiting and checking
power-even at the price of rendering government radically inefficient.'
So too, incorporation of materials on hate speech in other polities, such as
Canada or Germany, can help to illustrate how and why the U.S. approach,
which generally affords hate speech full and complete constitutional
protection under the First Amendment, lacks much influence in the wider
world.16 1
Moreover, the potential utility of comparative law perspectives is
hardly limited to constitutional law, or public law, topics-first-year
courses in property, tort, contract, criminal law, and civil procedure could
all be enhanced and improved by incorporating comparative law materials.
Professor Jackson suggests that a comparative approach could prove
helpful in myriad contexts, including, but not limited to, health and safety
regulation and criminal procedure.16 6
However, some cautionary notes are in order. Undertaking comparative
law scholarship does present some unique pitfalls, such as language
barriers that limit a (monolingual) U.S. legal academic's ability to access
and engage primary and secondary sources within the polity serving as a
point of departure. Perhaps the biggest problem is simply "not knowing
what you do not know"-to paraphrase former Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld.167 Even in the absence of a language barrier, legal terms
of art can and do have different meanings in an English-speaking foreign
polity, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the United Kingdom.
164. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 234-53 (Thomas Ginsburg &
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Shot (Not) Heard 'Round the World:
Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Legislative and Executive
Powers, 51 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2010); see also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth Cisar, "If Angels Were to
Govern ": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation ofPowers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450-
51(1991).
165. See Krotoszynski, supra note 88, at 45, 53-58, 61-2, 90-92, 135-38.
166. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 111.
167. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y, Dep't of Def., DoD News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002) (transcript
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636) ("But there are also
unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.").
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Moreover, it is critically important to pay close attention to government
structure and to institutional powers and constraints; one cannot assume
that legal institutions outside the United States observe the same structural
rules and constraints as U.S. governmental entities. This happens to be a
point of emphasis for Professor Jackson-she argues that attention to
structural details is essential to engaging in a credible comparative law
analysis.168 Of course, difficulties arise whenever a person attempts to
master a new field of scholarly inquiry, and learning the structural and
substantive rules governing the operation of a foreign legal system clearly
constitutes a substantial and difficult undertaking for anyone teaching or
writing using comparative law as a methodology.169
At least to a limited degree, law schools seem to be moving toward a
broader embrace of comparative law and comparative law
methodologies.170 In large part, this is a natural and inescapable offshoot of
the growth in transnational commerce; it is also a product of a more tightly
integrated media environment, in which a story taking place in one place
becomes widely known virtually everywhere, and almost instantaneously.
This should mean that comparative law materials will be available more
readily across the curriculum, both in terms of dedicated instructional
material (such as course supplements), but also with respect to inclusion in
casebooks for domestic law subjects. Obviously, the more readily
accessible the relevant materials, the easier it would be to incorporate
comparative law into a domestic law school course.
The scholarship angle is a bit more difficult, primarily because, as
noted earlier, incorporating a comparative law perspective entails making a
significant investment of time and energy in learning about not just a legal
rule or problem in another polity, but also something about the legal,
political, and more general social culture of the place, in addition to a
working knowledge of the legal and political institutions of the other
nation. On the other hand, if one becomes reasonably familiar with an area
of law in another nation, and with the relevant legal and political
168. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 227-32, 237-41, 252-54.
169. See Fontana, supra note 33, at 562-65 (discussing the difficulties of learning and applying
foreign law and suggesting several possible solutions, including "the creation of a transnational
constitutional law digest, restatements of comparative constitutional law, and more comparative
constitutional law casebooks").
170. See Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for Free
Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1053 (1998) (advocating the incorporation of more
international and comparative law materials into the standard J.D. curriculum); David Fontana, The Rise
and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2011)
(discussing the emergence and retrenchment of comparative constitutional law in U.S. law schools in
the post-WWII era); David Fontana, Chronicle Review, American Law Schools, Meet he World, 52
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 26, 2006, at B 10 (advocating enhanced attention to comparative law in
U.S. law schools).
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institutions as well, this comparative law toolkit can be used to facilitate
more than one project; thus, it is an investment that can and will pay
dividends over time.
I also would submit that it is not absolutely essential to know
everything in order to know anything; even relatively thin understandings
of foreign law can bring useful insights and change the way that an
instructor and her students perceive and understand a domestic legal issue.
Thus, the perfect, or the ideal, should not be sought to the complete
exclusion of the merely good. At the risk of being labeled either naive or
misguided (or perhaps both), the game seems clearly to be worth the
candle.
CONCLUSION: EMBRACING COMPLEXITY AND TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
An unfortunate tendency exists for legal scholars to be rewarded for
taking and defending unjustifiably bold stands. In a field rife with strong
advocates of highly polarized positions about the merits of transnational
judicial dialogue, Professor Jackson's cautious and highly nuanced
approach to the question of incorporating comparative and international
law perspectives into domestic constitutional law jurisprudence presents a
welcome departure from this pathology. She has made an important
contribution and meticulously researched and written a thoughtful, careful,
and highly persuasive work that demonstrates that totalizing claims about
judicial integration and judicial isolation simply do not bear up to close
scrutiny, either as a theoretical or an empirical matter.
Proponents of judicial globalization will not care much for Jackson's
normative and practical objections to the practice. They will disagree with
her consistent rejection of totalizing claims about the benefits of integrating
domestic legal systems with each other and also with international law.
Others will protest Jackson's claim that integration of domestic legal
systems with each other and international law would advance important
human rights values and cannot be successfully resisted in any event.
Whether one is a supporter of the new globalism or a skeptic, anyone
working in the field of comparative constitutional law will need to take
account of Professor Jackson's arguments in order to mount a persuasive
case for-or against-the creation of a more globalized system of law.
At the end of the day, Jackson herself is plainly an advocate of
informed and careful engagement. She posits that "candid embrace of
engagement and commitment to engage in a disciplined and open-minded
way should be the hallmarks of enlightened and enduring U.S.
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constitutionalism in the 21st century."'7' Jackson suggests that this
approach would best advance the durability and relevance of the
Constitution of 1787: "For if the U.S. Constitution is still 'intended to
endure for ages to come,' it must be able to navigate through the twenty-
first century's expanded universe of law."l 7 2 Moreover, she argues that
attainment of our goals and aspirations will be more, not less, likely if we
are open to considering old problems through new eyes. Jackson cogently
observes that "[t]o hold that judges should not even consider international
or foreign laws that may illuminate how our own constitution should be
understood - both in its specific relationships with other nations, and in its
commitments to (some) relatively universal normative understandings - is
to close one's eyes to an important set of constitutional purposes that would
be ill-served by such willful indifference or ignorance."73
At the end of the day, however, a higher level of engagement by U.S.
courts would require significant structural changes in both the U.S. system
of legal education and also in our practice norms-changes that are not
forthcoming absent a stronger signal from the judges staffing the federal
and state courts. On the other hand, despite the reality that strong forms of
transnational judicial dialogue in the United States are presently both
infeasible and improbable, Jackson's sound arguments for greater openness
to more modest efforts to use foreign and international law as a kind of
muse74 possess both merit and persuasive force. Even if we cannot
reasonably expect a wholesale revolution in the prominence and
importance of comparative and international law in the development of our
domestic constitutional law jurisprudence, surely broadly informed judges
should avail themselves of wisdom and inspiration wherever they happen
to find it.'
171. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 285.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 154.
174. See Krotoszynski, supra note 31, at 1322-23, 1356-59.
175. As Justice Elena Kagan stated the proposition at her Senate confirmation hearing, wise
judges should be "in favor of [utilizing] good ideas coming from wherever you can get them," even if
that happens to be from a foreign constitutional court or international tribunal. See supra note 24.
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